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Preserving the Archives of Freedom:
Justice Blackmun and First Amendment
Protections for Libraries
Mark C. Rahdert*
As anyone who has ever worked with him knows, Justice Harry
A. Blackmun loves libraries. He probably has spent more time in the
justices' Library at the United States Supreme Court than any other
justice, with the possible exception of Felix Frankfurter. Over the
years, he has developed close professional relations with the members of the Court's library staff. He spends hours each day by himself in the Justices' Library, laboring over opinions or preparing for
oral arguments, or, I suspect, sometimes just thinking. The judicial
opinions by which history will remember him, from Roe v. Wade1
on, were conceived and refined in libraries. 2 For Justice Blackmun,
libraries are a place for contemplation, for inspiration, for creative
and productive work.
Justice Blackmun even finds opportunities for recreation in libraries. Sometimes, just for fun, he will go next door to the Library
of Congress (where he is also well known to the staff) and spend a
few hours poring over the papers of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
Louis Brandeis, or one of his other predecessors on the Supreme
Court. Except for professional librarians themselves, few Americans
have spent more of their adult lives in libraries than Justice Blackmun. Among those who love the archives of the written word, Justice
Blackmun is surely in the first rank.
I had the opportunity personally to discover and savor Justice
Blackmun's love for libraries when I served as one of his law clerks
during the October 1979 Term. Because I had personal knowledge of
* Professor of Law, Temple University. I wish to thank Temple University School of
Law for financial support for the research of this article, Ronnie Seidel and Mark Dispoto for
their helpful research assistance, and Gladys Washington for her able secretarial assistance.
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Justice Blackmun has publicly acknowledged that he did much of the original research and work on Roe v. Wade during the summer of 1972 at the library of the Mayo Clinic
in Rochester. See Note, The Changing Social Vision of Justice Blackmun, 96 HARV. L. REV.
717, 723 n.34 (1983) (quoting from Blackmun, Remarks, Franco-American Colloquium of
Human Rights 14-15 (1979) (unpublished transcript)). Obviously, the vast majority of his
library work on opinions has occurred in the Justices' Library at the Supreme Court.
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the importance of libraries to Justice Blackmun, I took special note
when, a couple of years after my clerkship, the Court decided a case
involving libraries, Board of Education v. Pico s . The question in
Pico was whether the First Amendment limited the power of public

school authorities to remove books from a school library because of
objections to their content. It was a controversial decision, one that

failed to muster a majority on the Court.' The case is intriguing and
troubling in its own right, 5 but it took on special significance for me
because of the fact that Justice Blackmun wrote separately, concur-

ring in the judgment but not joining key portions of Justice Brennan's plurality opinion.6
Justice Blackmun's opinion in Pico provides a unique opportu-

nity to hunt for the essence of his constitutional vision. Here is an
opinion about the constitutional status of libraries, no doubt drafted

in a library, by a justice whose regard for libraries necessarily made
the question one of intense personal significance. As a separate opinion, it necessarily reflects Justice Blackmun's own personal views,
not some composite "common denominator" of the views of a group

of justices. One can find no better medium for pondering the unique
attributes of Justice Blackmun's approach to understanding the

Constitution.
What I find in Justice Blackmun's Pico concurrence is, I think,
of some potential importance for the future of the Bill of Rights. It
is a vigorous vision of civil liberty under the Constitution, but this

vision contrasts in significant ways with traditional assumptions
about what it is that the Bill of Rights protects. The differences that
are apparent in Justice Blackmun's Pico opinion are evident else3. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
4. For commentary on the Pico decision, see, e.g., Haig Bosmajian, The Judiciary's Use
of Metaphors, Metonymics and Other Tropes to Give First Amendment Protection to Students and Teachers, 15 J. L. & EDuC. 439, 459-63 (1986); Elizabeth M. Gamsky, Note, Judicial Clairvoyance and the First Amendment: The Role of Motivation in Judicial Review of
Book Banning in the Public Schools, 1983 U. ILL. L. REv. 731; Walter A. Kamiat, Note,
State Indoctrinationand the Protection of Non-State Voices in the Schools: Justifying a Prohibition of School Library Censorship, 35 STAN. L. REV. 497, 500 (1983); Stanley Ingber,
Socialization. Indoctrination, or the "Pall of Orthodoxy". Value Training in the Public
Schools, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 15, 53; William E. Lee, The Supreme Court and the Right to
Receive Expression, 1987 SuP. CT. REv. 303, 323-26; James C. O'Brien, Note, The Promise
of Pico: A new Definition of Orthodoxy, 97 YALE L.J. 1805 (1988); Tyll van Geel, The Search
for Constitutional Limits on Governmental Authority to Inculcate Youth, 62 TEx. L. REV.
197, 231 (1983); Mark G. Yudof, Library Book Selection and the PublicSchools: The Quest
for the Archimedean Point, 59 IND. L.J. 527, 541 (1984).
5. The difficulty of the case is suggested by the fact that it produced seven separate
opinions: the plurality opinion, Justice Blackmun's partial concurrence, Justice White's concurrence in the judgment, and four dissents. 457 U.S. at 853-55 (syllabus).
6. Id. at 875-82 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS

where in his jurisprudence. Collectively, they signal a new orientation for constitutional civil liberties.
Justice Blackmun is regarded today as one of the staunchest
guardians of liberty on the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. In the parlance of the journalists, that makes him a "liberal", although he was
not always so viewed.7 That Justice Blackmun believes in vigorous
constitutional protections for personal liberty must, at this stage in
his career, be generally acknowledged. But, as his Pico opinion demonstrates, his understanding of liberty, both of its essence and of the
way it must be protected, differs in important respects from the classic "liberal" tradition.
The difference in Justice Blackmun's approach begins to come
into relief when his work is assessed against that of other contemporary justices who have shared his concern for individual liberty. The
protections of the Bill of Rights have been blessed with many important advocates on the Supreme Court over the years, and some of the
greatest have served at one time or another with Justice Blackmun.
In his first year on the Court, Justice Blackmun worked briefly with
Justice Hugo Black.8 He also served half a decade with Justice William 0. Douglas. 9 And for two decades Justice Blackmun was both a
colleague and friend of Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.1 0 All three of
these colleagues of Justice Blackmun were vigorous and prolific defenders of the Bill of Rights. Each left an indelible mark on the annals of constitutional law, especially in the arena of the First
Amendment. All three were ardent defenders of liberty. All three
are regarded by historians and legal scholars as "liberal" members
of the Court during their respective tenures.
Despite their common reputations as "liberal" members of the
7. When he first came to the Court, and for several years thereafter, Justice Blackmun
was usually tagged as one of the Court's "conservative" members. More recently, the press has
been fond of calling him one of the Court's "liberals". Compare, e.g., Nathan Lewin, Supreme
Court: There is no Mistaking the Swing of the Pendulum, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1971, § 4, at
8 (describing Justice Blackmun as one of justices consistently voting on "conservative" side of
issues before the Court) with Linda Greenhouse, Court goes its Own Way on Key Regulatory
Cases, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1981, § 4, at 8 (describing Justice Blackmun as a "moderate
conservative") and with John Broder & David G. Savage, Bush to Act Fast on Court Nominee, L.A. TIMES, July 22, 1990, at A-I (describing Justice Blackmun as someone "touted as
conservative" at the time of his appointment who "instead became a leading liberal on the
court"). The apparent change in Justice Blackmun's position has been a subject of fairly frequent commentary, although some have contended that it has been more the Court than Justice Blackmun which did the changing. See, e.g., Stephen L. Wasby, Justice Harry A. Blackmun in the Burger Court, 11 HAMLINE L. REV. 183 (1988); Note, The ChangingSocial Vision
of Justice Blackmun, 96 HARV. L. REV. 717 (1983).
8. Justice Blackmun joined the Court in 1970. Justice Black died in office in 1971.
9. Justice Douglas retired from the Court in 1975.
10. Justice Brennan retired from the Court in 1990.
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Court, Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan undoubtedly brought
very different approaches to their work on the Court. At the risk of
overgeneralization, one could say that Justice Black was, throughout
his career, an unrelenting positivist; and on free speech issues, he
came as close as any Justice has been to being an absolutist. Justice
Douglas was nearly as unrelenting a realist, and an experimenter
who, perhaps more than any other member of the Court, sought inspiration from sources beyond traditional legal texts. Justice Brennan was a consummate consensus builder, and a doctrinal architect,
at once more eclectic and more inclined toward balancing than either Douglas or Black. Yet for all their differences, these three Justices shared some important common ground in their approach to
constitutional liberty. Each customarily viewed liberty in highly individualistic terms - the freedom of the isolated individual to think as
he or she chooses, to say what he or she believes, to worship in his or
her own way, and so forth. It is this stress on the individual character of liberty that binds them together in our minds as exponents of a
liberal jurisprudence.
Justice Blackmun's view of liberty is and always has been different. While Justice Blackmun's vision does not deny the significance
of the individual, it adds another important dimension. His jurisprudence, at least in contrast, is less likely to emphasize the individual
in isolation and is more likely to stress human interdependence. As a
consequence, his view of liberty embraces not only individuals, but
also relationships. For Justice Blackmun, the protections of the Bill
of Rights exist not just in glorious and rugged isolation, but also and perhaps more importantly - in the context of the interpersonal
and even institutional relationships that give context and meaning to
life and make it possible for the blessings of liberty to be enjoyed.
Some of these relationships, such as the relationships so eloquently
defended in Justice Blackmun's Bowers v. Hardwick dissent," are
themselves quite personal and very proximately an extension of the
self. But others, including the doctor-patient relation so controversially protected in Roe v. Wade,12 have significant institutional features. Nevertheless, in Justice Blackmun's constitutional philosophy,
these relationships - and the institutions on which they depend must somehow be protected from unwarranted governmental intru11. 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that right of privacy
extends to homosexual relationships).
12. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (extending the right of privacy to protect a pregnant woman
and "her responsible physician" in their "consultation" over decision whether to have an
abortion).
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sion, along with the individual interests the relationships foster, if
the liberties of the Bill of Rights are to have value and meaning in
modern life.
In his Pico concurrence, Justice Blackmun began charting some
new constitutional territory when he tried to describe such a constitutionally protected relationship - the relationship that exists in the
public school library. As he himself recognized, it is an exceedingly
difficult relationship to define. Indeed, one can hardly give it a name
or even identify precisely its principal participants. Yet for Justice
Blackmun the essence of the library experience is relational. What
ultimately distinguishes Justice Blackmun's approach to the issues in
Pico is his sense that where libraries are concerned, what the Constitution must protect is not some naked exercise of individualism, but
rather a complex relationship among (at a minimum) the reader, the
librarian, other patrons, the institution the library serves, and perhaps even the books themselves.
As Pico also demonstrates, the business of affording constitutional protection to such a web of relationships turns out to be much
trickier than the business of protecting individuals, tricky as that latter prospect often is. The state's role in relationships, especially institutional ones, is necessarily much greater than its role in individual
matters. Indeed, sometimes the state is the creator and provider of
the institution, and hence in a very real sense a participant in the
relationship itself, with interests and an agenda that must be accommodated along with those of the other participants. Moreover, even
if the state is not directly a participant, the individuals within the
relationship themselves may have conflicting interests which must
somehow be protected from each other. The arguments for allowing
some governmental intrusion, in the form of regulations, and for
qualifying the individual rights involved in such a relational setting,
are considerably more attractive than similar arguments would be
where purely personal interests are concerned. Problems with finding
appropriate remedies and means for assertion of the rights also become greater. Absolutism in any form is virtually impossible. The
balancing process that is such an ubiquitous component of constitutional adjudication inevitably becomes more difficult and more delicate. The task of articulating the lines between appropriate and inappropriate regulation becomes exponentially more challenging.
These difficulties may well lie somewhere behind the complex
trimester approach in Roe, which sought to balance the interests of
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mother, doctor, hospital, and the state. 13 They play a role in Justice
Blackmun's approach to the attorney-client relationship in cases such
as Bates v. State Bar.' They may even be involved in Justice Blackmun's first opinion for the Court, Wyman v. James, 5 which dealt
with a social worker-client relationship, although it is likely that his
approach to the problem of constitutionally protected relationships
was not yet fully developed. The same challenges and difficulties inhere as well in the highly controversial issue of First Amendment
protection for school libraries.
In the pages that follow, I will attempt to describe the Pico
case, Justice Blackmun's separate views, and the ways his approach
contrasts with the more individualistic "liberal" solution to the same
problem that Justice Brennan advanced for the plurality. In doing
so, I hope to offer a few reflections on the challenges of constructing
a jurisprudence of constitutionally protected relationships - challenges I believe the Court will encounter with increasing frequency
in the coming century.
I.

The Background of Pico

The problem the Court encountered in Pico is whether there are
constitutional limits on the government's ability to regulate the content of libraries in public schools. It is a problem that inevitably
arises when a democratically elected government undertakes the business of public education. Having decided to educate, the state must
decide how to educate. This means, among other things, what to
teach and what ideas and information to present. In a literate society, the transmission of knowledge and ideas inevitably will occur
through the written word, which means that any institution of public
education must have books. The books, if there are a sufficient number of them, must be organized in some way for access and retrieval,
which gives rise to the need for libraries. Thus, in the pursuit of
public education, government must create and operate school libraries. In this country there must be literally hundreds of thousands of
such libraries situated in public schools throughout the land.
Of course, government does not limit its involvement in the library business to public schools. In addition to libraries in schools,
government also provides libraries in state colleges and universities,
13. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
14. 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (First Amendment prohibits absolute ban on attorney
advertising).
15. 400 U.S. 309, 323 (1971) (rejecting application of Fourth Amendment in context of
welfare caseworker-client relationship).
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as well as lending libraries that serve the general public. Nearly
every city of significant size has at least one, often many, of these
public libraries. Indeed, they are so common that general-interest
private lending libraries have all but disappeared from the American
16
scene.
All this means that the government has entered the library business in a very big way. Indeed, the vast majority of the libraries in
this country are owned and operated by the state. In a very real
sense, then, our collective capacity for access to the non-journalistic
written word heavily depends on the auspices of government. 17 The
government buys the books; it houses and cares for them; it allows
them to circulate; and ultimately, the government decides when and
how to dispose of them. Since the government determines what
books and other materials its libraries possess, it has the potential to
profoundly influence what we think and believe. The extent to which
it can do so is the heart of the Pico problem.
Since the government owns and operates these libraries, it must
somehow select the books that they contain. And, since the government is democratically elected, citizens inevitably demand a role in
the selection process. This is potentially an issue with respect to any
public library, but it is particularly true in public education. In their
role as the ultimate overseers of public education, and in their much
more emotionally charged role as parents of public school pupils, the
citizens of a community are likely to demand from their local board
of education some level of accountability regarding the contents of
school libraries within their district. If the citizens (usually in their
role as parents or guardians) discover their children reading material
that they regard as offensive or inappropriate, they are likely to object. This is especially true if the children are reading material that
directly offends or challenges values the parents are trying to inculcate at home. The result can be intense pressure on the school board
to direct school libraries either not to stock certain books, or, more
likely, to remove certain objectionable ones from the library
16. For a pre-Pico discussion of First Amendment limitations on controls over book selection in public libraries, see Robert M. O'Neil, Libraries, Librarians and First Amendment
Freedoms, 4 HUMAN RIGHTS 295 (1975); Robert M. O'Neil, Libraries, Liberties and the First
Amendment, 42 U. CINN. L. REV. 209 (1973). In the latter article, Professor O'Neil takes
specific note of our collective dependence on public libraries. Id. at 240. See also Richard
Ricci, Public School Library Book Removals: Community Values - First Amendment Freedoms, 57 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 166 (1981).
17. O'Neil, Libraries, Liberties and the First Amendment, supra note 16, at 240
(stressing dependence of the reading public on public libraries).
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shelves.'"
There is nothing particularly new about this phenomenon. 19 It
has been around as long as public schools and their libraries have
been in operation. But there do seem to be periods when public pressure on school boards to control the contents of school libraries
grows more intense. According to contemporary accounts, the years
immediately preceding the Pico decision comprised one such period.
In the 1970's and early 1980's, there was a wave of public pressure
on school boards to control the contents of school libraries."0 One
place where this happened was Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26, on Long Island in the State of New York.
The issue first arose in 1975, after some members of the local
Board of Education attended a conference about education sponsored
by a politically conservative organization. At the conference, the
board members received a list of books described as "improper fare
for school students."'" Upon return to their community, they learned
that some of these books were available in the junior high and high
school libraries.2 2 They raised the matter with the full Board of Education, and the Board in turn directed the schools to remove the
books. In a public statement, the Board justified this action on the
ground that the books were "anti-American, anti-Christian, antiSem[i]tic, and just plain filthy."213 Later, the Board set up a "Book
Review Committee" consisting of parents and board members to
read the books and recommend whether they should be retained. The
Committee recommended that some of the books be reinstated. The
18. I say that pressure for book removal is more likely, because the matter is not likely
to come to parents' attention until their children bring the books home from school. It is at
that point, after the books have been purchased and placed in circulation, that parents will be
prompted to raise their objections and demand withdrawal of the offending publication.
19. Yudof, supra note 4, at 537 (observing that book controversies in schools date back
to 1800's).
20. See Kamiat, supra note 4, at 497-98 and n.3 (noting frequency of disputes over
contents of school materials and collecting cases on school library book removals); Yudof,
supra note 4, at 538 (noting that by 1981, the American Library Association's Office for
Intellectual Freedom reported over 900 book removal controversies a year).
21. 457 U.S. at 856.
22. Nine books in the high school library were: SLAUGHTER HOUSE FIVE, by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.; THE NAKED APE, by Desmond Morris; DOWN THESE MEAN STREETS, by Piri
Thomas; BEST SHORT STORIES OF NEGRO WRITERS, edited by Langston Hughes; Go ASK
ALICE, of anonymous authorship; LAUGHING Boy, by Oliver LaFarge; BLACK Boy, by Rich-

ard Wright; A HERO AIN'T NOTHIN' BUT A SANDWICH, by Alice Childress; and SOUL ON ICE,
by Eldridge Cleaver. One book in the junior high school library was A READER FOR WRITERS,
edited by Jerome Archer. Another book on the list of "improper fare" was actually used in the
curriculum of a twelfth grade literature course. Pico, 457 U.S. at 856-57, n.3.
23. Id. at 857 (quoting from district court decision, 474 F. Supp. 387, 390 (E.D.N.Y.
1979)). The district court opinion contains the entire text of the press release the Board issued
to justify its actions.
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Board, however, ultimately rejected most of the recommendations of
the Committee and directed that all but one of the
books should be
24
shelves.
libraries'
the
from
removed
permanently

Some students brought suit in federal court, arguing that the
Board had removed the books because they "offended their social,
political and moral tastes and not because the books, taken as a
whole, were lacking in educational value."2' 5 The trial court granted
summary judgment for the defendants and dismissed the action. 26 A
sharply divided court of appeals reversed the district court decision,
holding that the case presented triable issues of fact.2 The Supreme
Court, just as sharply divided, affirmed by a five to four vote the
Court of Appeals' order remanding the matter for trial on the merits. Of the nine justices participating in the decision, seven wrote
separate opinions.
A.

Justice Brennan's Plurality Opinion

As mentioned above, Justice Brennan announced the judgment
of the Court in a plurality opinion. His opinion essentially took two
alternative approaches to the problem.
First, Justice Brennan viewed the case as involving an attempt
by the state to regulate individuals' access to ideas and information.
He cited prior decisions in which the Court had recognized a right of
access as a corollary of the First Amendment's rights of free expression.281 Justice Brennan identified two subsidiary interests protected
24. .d. at 857-58.
25. Id. at 858-59 (quoting from record).
26. Pico v. Boards of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District, 474 F. Supp.
387 (1979).
27. Pico v. Board of Education, 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980). Judge Sifton, announced
the judgment for the circuit court. Judge Newman filed a separate opinion concurring in the
result. Judge Mansfield dissented. In his opinion, Judge Sifton concluded that "[w]hatever
may be said in favor of the good intentions of the school officials in this case . . . little may be
said in support of their sensitivity or precision in dealing with the First Amendment issues in
this case." He criticized the board for acting in an "erratic, arbitrary and free-wheeling manner" and for behaving "in a manner calculated to create public uproar." Id. at 416. Judge
Newman found sufficient uncontested evidence in the record to support a prima facie claim
that the Board had removed the books because of objections to the ideas they contained; he
stressed, however, that the Board might be able to prevail at trial if it could prove that "the
books were removed because of vulgar language and explicit sexual descriptions, matters on
which school authorities have considerable latitude." Id. at 436. Judge Mansfield stressed "undisputed evidence that all but one of the eight books discontinued by the Board in this case
contained indecent matter, vulgarities, profanities, explicit sexual descriptions or allusions, sexual perversion, or disparaging remarks about Blacks, Jews, or Christ." He concluded that this
evidence was sufficient to place the book removal within the Board's permissible discretion. He
also noted that the Board has not prevented any student or teacher from "discuss[ing] in or
out of school the ideas contained in the discontinued books." Id. at 419.
28. Justice Brennan relied on First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
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by this right of access - the right of an individual to "send" ideas
to others, and the right of an individual to "receive" such ideas. Of
the two he found the right to receive ideas to be more important, as
it "is a necessary predicate to the recipient's meaningful exercise of
2 9
his own rights of speech, press, and political freedom.
Safeguarding this right is especially important in an educational
environment, Justice Brennan concluded, because "such access
prepares students for active and effective participation in the pluralistic, often contentious society in which they will soon be adult members."8 0 Although he recognized that First Amendment rights of students, including this right of access, must be tailored to the unique
demands of the school environment, he concluded that "the special
characteristics of the school library make that environment especially appropriate for the recognition of the First Amendment rights
of students." 3 1 He characterized the library as a place where students, on their own, explore and discover knowledge, acquire information, and experience beauty. 32 Because the library is a place of
individual activity, Justice Brennan concluded that the school board
had no business attempting to use it as a medium for "transmit [ting]
community values." He argued: "petitioners' reliance upon that duty
[to inculcate community values] is misplaced where, as here, they
attempt to extend their claim of absolute discretion beyond the compulsory environment of the classroom, into the school library and the
regime of voluntary inquiry that there holds sway." 3 3
Justice Brennan's second tack focused on First Amendment
cases that prohibit the government from "prescrib[ing] what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion. . . ."I" Drawing upon Keyishian v. Board of Regents, which
783 (1978); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557, 564 (1969); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-763 (1972); and Martin v.
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943), among others, for the idea that the First Amendment
guarantees individuals a right to receive information and ideas. 457 U.S. at 866-67.
29. Id. at 867.
30. Id. at 868.
31. Id.
32. Justice Brennan argued:
A school library, no less than any other public library, is "a place dedicated to
quiet, to knowledge, and to beauty." Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142
(1966) (opinion of Fortas, J.). Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589
(1967), observed that "students must always remain free to inquire, to study and
to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding." The school library is the
principal locus of such freedom.
Id. at 868-69 (footnote citation omitted).
33. 457 U.S. at 868-69.
34. Id. at 870 (quoting West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
642 (1943)). In addition to Barnette, Justice Brennan relied on Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
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had held that "the First Amendment. . . does not tolerate laws that
cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom,"' 5 Justice Brennan reasoned that it would violate the constitution for public school officials
to employ school library book selection as a means for enforcing political preferences. For example, he argued, few would deny the impropriety of Democratic school officials trying to suppress writings
favoring Republicans, or Republican officials behaving likewise toward Democrats. 6 Similarly, he suggested, "the same conclusion
would surely apply if an all-white school board, motivated by racial
animus, decided to remove all books authored by blacks or advocating equality and integration.137 Because the constitution would forbid such crass political or ideological manipulation of a library's contents, Justice Brennan inferred that "whether petitioners' removal of
books from their school libraries denied respondents their First
Amendment rights depends upon the motivation behind petitioners'
actions. If the petitioners intended by their removal decision to deny
respondents access to ideas with which petitioners disagreed, and if
this intent was the decisive factor in petitioners' decision, then petitioners have exercised their discretion in violation of the
Constitution."' 8
To guide this motive inquiry, Justice Brennan set up two alternative categories of decision, one permissible, the other forbidden. It
would be permissible, he argued, for the board of education to remove a book based on its "educational suitability. 3 9 On the other
hand, if the motivation for the removal was a desire to prohibit access to ideas, the action would be forbidden. It would be the job of
the district court on remand to sift through the evidence to determine the Board's controlling motivation. Justice Brennan did not say
how the court was supposed to distinguish between educational suitability and control over access to ideas. He did conclude, however,
that the respondents' complaint raised triable issues of fact concerning the propriety of the Board's motivation for its action. In particular, he criticized the Board's failure to operate according to regular,
385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1968) and Mt.
Healthy City Board of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) for this facet of his argument.
35. 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
36. Pico, 457 U.S. at 870-71.
37. Id. at 871.
38. Id. at 871 (citation omitted).
39. Actually, Justice Brennan did not go quite so far. Rather, he relied on the respondents' concession that a decision based on suitability would be permissible. Id. at 871 (quoting
transcript of oral argument, at 53). Whether he would have reached the same conclusion independently of the parties' concession, Justice Brennan did not clearly say.
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established procedures in its attempts to review the school libraries'
collections.4 0
B.

Justice Blackmun's Concurrence

In his separate opinion, Justice Blackmun agreed with the second part of Justice Brennan's analysis but rejected the first. Justice
Blackmun was willing to agree that the case presented at least a
colorable claim that the Board was trying to impose orthodoxy, and
he accepted the motivational- test that Justice Brennan had advanced
as a reasonably workable standard for assessing that claim.'" -But
Justice Blackmun objected to the suggestion that the case turned on
the respondents' "right of access" to ideas or information. He did so
because of what he characterized as a "somewhat different perspective on the nature of the First Amendment right involved."' 2
Justice Blackmun began with the observation that "this case
presents a particularly complex problem because it involves two competing principles of constitutional stature." The first of these principles he characterized as the state's acknowledged power, indeed its
responsibility, to "prepar[e] . . . individuals for participation as citizens" and to "preserv[e] . . . the values on which our society
rests."' 3 Justice Blackmun reasoned that this power is of constitutional stature because "the Constitution presupposes the existence of
an informed citizenry prepared to participate in governmental affairs, and these democratic principles are constitutionally incorporated into the structure of our government.""" Arrayed against this
constitutionally safeguarded power of the state, however, is a second,
competing principle that prohibits governmental prescription of ideological orthodoxy. This principle Justice Blackmun described in carefully circumscribed terms: "the State may not suppress exposure to
ideas - for the sole purpose of suppressing exposure to those ideas
absent sufficiently compelling reasons."' 5
Justice Blackmun explained that his principle was "both narrower and more basic than the 'right to receive information' identified by the plurality."' 6 He specifically rejected the idea "that the
40. Justice Brennan commented: "This would be a very different case if the record
demonstrated that petitioners had employed established, regular, and facially unbiased procedures for the review of controversial materials." Id. at 874.
41. 457 U.S. at 882 (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
42. Id. at 876-78.
43. Id. (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979)).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 877.
46. 457 U.S. at 878.
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State has any affirmative obligation to provide students with information or ideas."4 7 Nor did he accept the notion that the library was
somehow immune from the government's responsibility to promote
civic values. "[I]f schools may be used to inculcate ideas, surely libraries may play a role in that process." '48 The problem, as he saw it,
lay not in the state's decision to make content-based choices regarding the holdings of the library, but rather in its use of such choices
to stifle diversity of thought.
Perceiving a "tension . . .between the properly inculcative purposes of public education and any limitation on the school board's
absolute discretion to choose academic materials,"'4 9 Justice Blackmun argued that distinguishing between permissible and impermissible choices necessarily involves a process of "delicate accommodation." 50 To assist that process, he offered a partial catalogue of some
"politically neutral" reasons for book removal that, in his view,
would not offend the Constitution. In essence, he thereby attempted
to define with more particularity the category of "educational suitability" that Justice Brennan had advanced. Justice Blackmun concluded that there was a satisfactory basis for "choos[ing] one book
over another" in at least seven circumstances: 1) "when the first
book is deemed more relevant to the curriculum"; 2) when it is "better written"; 3) when the choice is dictated by "space or financial
limitations"; 4) when one book "contains offensive language"; 5)
when "it is psychologically or intellectually inappropriate for the age
group"; possibly 6) when "the ideas it advances are 'manifestly inimical to the public welfare' ";and 7) when "school officials . . .believe that one subject is more important, or is more deserving of
emphasis." 5 1
Conceding that "the problem here is a difficult one," 52 and that
the plurality's motivation test would be "difficult to apply,"5 3 Justice
Blackmun nevertheless rejected the implicit suggestions of both the
plurality and dissenting opinions that the matter "should be resolved
by choosing one principle over another."'" Instead, he asserted that
the competing principles could be reconciled by circumscribing the
state's discretion only where there was "an intentional attempt to
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at

878.
881.
879.
880 (citations omitted).
881-82.
882.
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shield students from certain ideas that officials find politically distasteful."5 Because he agreed with Justice Brennan that there was
enough evidence on the record at least to raise the possibility of such
a suppressive purpose, he joined in the Court's judgment of
affirmance.
II.

Individualism v. Relationships: Comparison and Contrast

Although they ended up embracing a common standard, there is
a distinct difference in the approaches Justice Brennan and Justice
Blackmun took to this problem. 6 That difference stems, at least in
part, from a variance in perception of the role that a library plays in
a public school. It also stems from a different characterization of the
form, substance and participants in library activity.
Justice Brennan's opinion views the library as essentially passive
and impersonal - a simple repository of books, periodicals and reference materials available for circulation. The only active role is
played by the reader, who functions in a discrete and highly individualistic fashion. The reader engages in independent, "voluntary inquiry."' 57 Operating on her own, she selects for herself what materi-

als to consult. She uses the library as a conduit in the process of
individually acquiring the information and ideas that matter to her.
The reader explores the intellectual and artistic offerings of the library on her own, guided principally by her own interests, tastes,
and judgment. The library serves the single purpose of providing her
access to the information or ideas she selects. Justice Brennan's
55. Id.
56. Less surprisingly, there is also a sharp difference between Justice Blackmun's approach and that taken by the various dissenters, or by Justice White in his concurrence in the
judgment. Chief Justice Burger, Justice Powell, Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor all
filed separate dissents, all of which argued in various ways that the school board's need to set
educational policy outweighed students' interest in access to particular publications. 457 U.S.
at 887 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (first amendment does not require that "if a writer has something to say, the government through its schools must be the courier"); Id. at 894 (Powell, J.,
dissenting) ("the resolution of educational policy decisions through litigation, and the exposure
of school board members to liability for such decisions, can be expected to corrode the school
board's authority and effectiveness"); Id. at 920 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("I think the Court
will far better serve the cause of First Amendment jurisprudence by candidly recognizing that
the role of government as sovereign is subject to more stringent limitations than is the role of
government as . . . educator. . . With respect to the education of children in elementary and
secondary schools, the school board may properly determine in many cases that a particular
book, a particular course, or even a particular area of knowledge is not educationally suitable
for inclusion within the body of knowledge which the school seeks to impart."); Id. at 921
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("It is the school board that must determine educational suitability,
and it has done so in this case."). Justice White argued that the Court could adequately dispose of the case simply by ruling that summary judgment was premature, without addressing
the first amendment question. Id. at 883-84 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
57. 457 U.S. at 869.
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characterization of the library thus treats it as a sort of intellectual
vendeteria, a machine-like entity that mechanically and impersonally
dispenses books and magazines to isolated and independent consumers, much as the typical food vendeteria dispenses potato chips and
candy bars.
58
Justice Blackmun's view of the library is much more complex.
At a minimum, it involves at least three affirmative actors rather
than one. Instead of a reader exploring knowledge by herself, we
have the reader seeking knowledge in the company of other readers,
under the guidance of the librarian. Moreover, the interaction among
these three actors is profoundly influenced by the educator-student
relationship that permeates the public school environment and extends into the public school library. As a consequence, the function
of the library cannot be determined solely according to the dictates
of the reader's individual quest for knowledge. Instead, the reader's
interests are necessarily tempered by the relational character of the
setting - by both interpersonal and institutional factors that inhere
in the nature of libraries themselves, and even more fundamentally
in the character of the educational enterprise.
Justice Blackmun did not specifically identify these tempering
factors, although his list of permissible reasons for book removal give
some very strong hints as to what they are. Working from that list,
we may try to articulate some of the leading considerations.
Let us begin with the nature of libraries. At the outset, it is
obvious that libraries cannot possibly carry every possible publication. We live in a society that publishes vast quantities of material,
far beyond what any library could afford to acquire and keep. Financial and physical constraints thus substantially limit what most libraries can carry. This is probably especially true of public school
libraries, where space and funding are often likely to be in particu59
larly short supply.
Beyond these immediate institutional constraints, and in part
because of them, it is apparent that in most libraries the librarians
must routinely cull their holdings. They must, in other words, regu58. Yudof, supra note 4, at 543. Yudof has described Justice Blackmun's opinion as
"sensitive to the subtleties and complexities of the issue before the Court."
59. See O'Neil, Libraries, Liberties, and the First Amendment, supra note 16, at 252
("With the possible exception of the Library of Congress, no facility in the country has the
cataloguing staff or the space, much less the budget, to carry more than a fraction of published
works. Every library must be selective, and the smaller libraries must be highly so."). Advances in the technology for electronic transfer of information may, to some extent, ameliorate
space limitations in the future. But financial limitations are likely to remain. Moreover, even in
a computerized world, decisions about what books to keep in circulation will be inevitable.
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larly remove books from the library as a necessary component of
their jobs. They do this in order to maximize the library's potential
benefit for their patrons. As newer, more accurate, more up-to-date,
and perhaps even more popular publications become available, the
librarian must make room for them on the shelves by selectively
pulling and discarding some of the existing publications. Otherwise,
housing the collection soon would become impossible, and retrieval
of materials would become unduly complicated, especially in a library with limited staff.60
Thus, for a library (especially a school library) to function successfully, the librarians must be able to remove books. They must
have at least some discretion to cut off the reader's "access" to particular volumes. The issue, therefore, is not whether library officials
can deny readers access to information or ideas, but rather how they
should go about doing so.
It is also reasonably clear that in culling the collection, librarians cannot avoid making choices based on content. 61 For example, a
librarian might reasonably decide to reduce the offerings in a relatively static field of knowledge, in order to make room for publications in another area where knowledge is exploding. And within a
particular subject, a librarian might cull a book that relies on superseded data or fails to discuss new theories in favor of another that is
more comprehensive and up-to-date. These decisions all unavoidably
depend on relative assessments of content. Indeed, in the library business there must even be room for evaluative judgments that one
publication is simply "better" or more "popular" than another. 62 For
example, few would challenge the propriety of a librarian removing
the seldom-used work of some third-rate poet or playwright in order
to make room for a volume of Shakespeare or Keats that is likely to
be much in demand. Such comparative judgments are as common in
a library as they are in, say, an art museum. Indeed, the library
could not well function without them. 63
60. See, e.g., President's Council, District 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457
F.2d 289, 293 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972):
"The administration of any library, whether it be a university or particularly a
public junior high school, involves a constant process of selection and winnowing
based not only on educational needs but financial and architectural realities."
See also, O'Neil, Libraries, Liberties and the First Amendment, supra note 16, at 252 (noting
factors that typically govern process of library book selection and removal).
61. See Yudof, supra note 4, at 535.
62. See, e.g., O'Neil, Libraries, Liberties, and the First Amendment, supra note 16, at
252 (identifying "reader demand" and "critical acclaim" as "wholly legitimate" factors in
book selection and removal).
63. Cf. Yudof, supra note 4, at 535 (arguing that "a blanket ban on content distinctions,

FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS

On the other hand, a library (especially a public library) loses
its essential character if publications can be removed simply as a
reflection of the personal tastes, values, or political convictions of the
librarian (or the librarian's employer). The very purpose of the library is to reflect in its offerings a range of subjects, tastes, attitudes,
values, forms of expression, philosophical perspectives, and political
creeds. Even a small library should cover a multitude of subjects,
and within each subject area it should include a reasonably diverse
set of offerings. This is true in part because the library serves not
one, but many readers, each of whom will come with a different intellectual agenda."' It is also true in part because the library serves
as the archives of an intellectual heritage which is itself both extensive and extraordinarily diverse.
It follows then that denial of access - book removal - cannot
be prohibited in its entirety, but neither can it be fully allowed.
Some forms of book removal are consistent with a library's basic
function and purpose, while others are not. It also follows that the
line between permissible and impermissible forms of removal cannot
be drawn simply in terms of the reader's interests. Readers cannot
lay claim to a right of access to any particular book or other publication, because virtually any item in the library's collection might be
removed for a host of perfectly valid reasons. Indeed, given the realities of limited space and budget, and the constant need to update
collections, such claims of access are likely to cancel each other out;
the library simply cannot afford to satisfy everyone's request.
Moreover, the traditional first amendment proscription against
content-based distinctions 5 does not work well here either, because a
library cannot function without librarians making content-specific
judgments.6 The nature of the library as an institution, and the inirrespective of the mission of the governmental institution, is constitutionally and practically
absurd").
64. Obviously, the personal library of a private individual is a completely different matter. There, we would expect the library's selections to represent the owner's tastes, values, and
preferences. But that is precisely the point. What is proper, even desirable, in a personal context would be inappropriate if done publicly under the auspices of government.
65. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S.Ct. 2538 (1992) (holding that content-based
punishment of fighting words violates the first amendment); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312
(1988) (ordinance making content-based discrimination between permissible and impermissible forms of picketing in front of a foreign embassy violate the First Amendment); Police
Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (holding unconstitutional a statute that
selectively banned picketing based on content). Cf. Geoffrey R. Stone, Cohtent Regulation and
the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189 (1983).
66. See Yudof, supra note 4, at 535. This necessity for content-based judgment in library book selection was repeatedly stressed by the Pico dissenters as evidence of the weakness
and artificiality of the plurality's "right of access" position. See, e.g., Pico, 457 U.S. at 917
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terplay of competing interests and concerns within it, necessitate a
more "delicate accommodation" than is possible under the broad
principles of access or content neutrality.
In a public school library, the situation becomes further complicated by the relationship that extends from the library to the rest of
the school. One of the main functions of a public school library is to
serve as an adjunct and a supplement to the classroom curriculum. If
a literature teacher assigns book reports, books that are adequate to
the purpose must be available in the school library. If a history
teacher assigns term papers on the fall of the Roman Empire or the
rise of the American Republic, the library must carry adequate resource materials on these subjects. If a science teacher requires students to develop science projects, the library must carry materials
they can consult for inspiration. And so on. The school library, in
other words, must reflect in its collections not only a broad range of
information and ideas, or a microcosm of intellectual heritage, but
also a reinforcement of the school curriculum. 7
This fact greatly expands the role of content judgment in the
book selection process. Because the web of relevant relationships expands to include the school faculty and administration, their content
judgments about curriculum and instruction will in turn affect the
library's holdings. If teachers choose to stress one scientific theory
over another, the library will need to carry more books describing
and discussing that preferred theory. If teachers choose to stress particular kinds of literature or particular authors, those choices will be
reflected in the library as well. The library does more than just reflect the curriculum, so that its offerings may not be controlled entirely by curricular preferences and needs. But the library's collection must at least partially mirror the intellectual emphases of the
school's educational program.
The interactive relationship between the library and the rest of
the school generates an important corollary to the principle of inevitable content judgment in book selection. If the public school bears
(Rehnquist J., dissenting) ("Justice Brennan concludes . . . that a removal decision based
solely upon the 'educational suitability' of a book or upon its perceived vulgarity is 'perfectly
permissible. . . . But such determinations are based as much on the content of the book as
determinations that the book espouses pernicious political views."(citation omitted)). On this
point, Justice Blackmun essentially agreed with the dissenters, id. at 877-78, although he did
not share their inference that all content-based decisions must therefore be constitutionally
permitted.
67. See Kamiat, supra note 4, at 508 ("As a descriptive matter, the idea that a school
library is different from a classroom because it serves nonindoctrinative goals seems wrong. A
school library can just as easily be viewed as a place for bounded student inquiry under the
school authorities' direction than as a place for broad, self-directed student exploration.").
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the public responsibility of inculcating civic virtues (and on the
Court, at least, there is broad and longstanding consensus that it
does), 6 8 and if the curriculum is a primary vehicle for discharging
that public duty, then the inculcative characteristics of the curriculum will also be reflected in library policies, both in terms of initial
book selection and in the ongoing process of book removal. Public
school librarians can serve their appropriate function by choosing
one book over another because the preferred book, in their opinion,
will do a better job of inculcating civic virtues.6 9
These relational and institutional features of the public school
library are what prompted Justice Blackmun to reject a right of access as a useful paradigm for discerning the first amendment protections for libraries. They also led him to reject a principle of content
neutrality as an adequate basis for setting the boundaries of permissible book removal. Nevertheless, in the same web of relationships
Justice Blackmun found the foundation for a "narrower" yet more
"basic" set of first amendment limitations.70 Just as the educational
institution may make legitimate demands on the public school library, the library, its staff, and its patrons may in turn make some
collective demands of the institution. In these legitimate counter-demands one can locate the root of some important first amendment
protections.
Probably the most important of these countervailing influences
is the demand of intellectual and artistic diversity. As noted above, a
library ceases to function as a library if it fails to include a range of
subjects, and a range of offerings within each subject. While it might
be permissible for the school to augment the curriculum by including
more of a particular subject, author, or idea, it would destroy the
library to make that subject, author, or idea exclusive. For the library to serve its function as an archive of a diverse and dynamic
68. With the sole exception of Justice White, who found it unnecessary to reach first
amendment issues, all the Justices in Pico acknowledged the legitimacy of public schools inculcating values. 457 U.S. at 864, 869 (plurality opinion) (acknowledging public school's duty to
inculcate values but finding it insufficient to defend removal of books from library); id. at 876
(opinion of Blackmun, J.); id. at 889 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 896 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 913-14 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 921 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Cf Plyler
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979). For a discussion of the "conflict between acculturation and autonomy" in the public schools, see Yudof,
supra note 4, at 527-30. For a general discussion of government's inculcative role, see MARK

G.

YUDOF, WHEN GOvERNMENT SPEAKS, 52-55 (1983).

69. In this respect the public school library is probably different from its communitybased counterpart. A public library serving the general community has a much weaker claim
to the proposition that it exists for the purpose of cultivating community values, other than the
values of free inquiry and free expression that undergird the first amendment itself.
70. Pico, 457 U.S. at 878 (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
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intellectual heritage, it must not only offer the preferred texts, the
ones that dovetail with the curriculum and reinforce its objectives,
but also the leading titles that challenge the preferred texts and that
call the curricular objectives into question, or that depart from them.

Moreover, including such offerings enhances rather than diminishes the educational function. An idea lacks merit if it cannot withstand challenge; a value has little worth if it cannot survive a test.
The validity of a principle is best demonstrated by the inability of its
critics to prove it false. Thus, if students are really to learn the values and ideas that pervade the curriculum, an important part of that
learning process will involve testing those ideas and values in the
crucible of competing opinion." Some of that testing may go on in
the classroom itself. A significant additional portion is likely to occur

in the school library.
In addition, the library can demand of the school a measure of
independence for the professional librarian. Just as a measure of academic freedom is essential to the function of teaching, a measure of
independence in the shaping. of collections is essential to the function
of library science. 72 Librarians, like other professionals, are guided
by a set of ethical principles in the performance of their work.73 For
71. See O'Brien, supra note 4, at 1823 ("Ideas reach students in today's society. The
problem is to insure that students know how to take those ideas seriously.").
72. For arguments that library science should enjoy first amendment protection roughly
akin to the scholar's claim to academic freedom, see O'Neil, Libraries, Librariansand First
Amendment Freedoms, supra note 16, at 307-09. See also O'Neil, Libraries, Liberties and the
First Amendment, supra note 16, at 245-47.
The interests of librarians did not receive explicit attention in any of the Supreme Court's
Pico opinions, probably because the district court had ruled that the plaintiffs lacked standing
to raise librarians' claims. Pico v. Board of Ed., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., 474
F.Supp. 387, 394 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
73. In its 1981 Statement on Professional Ethics, the American Library Association
declared:
Librarians significantly influence or control the selection, organization, preservation, and dissemination of information. In a political system grounded in an informed citizenry, librarians are members of a profession explicitly committed to
intellectual freedom and the freedom of access to information. We have a special
obligation to ensure the free flow of information and ideas to present and future
generations.
The second article of the librarians' Code of Ethics states: "Librarians must resist all efforts
by groups or individuals to censor library materials." AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF LIBRARIANS.
STATEMENT ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, 1981, reprinted in CODES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 187 (Rena A. Gorlin, ed. 1986).
In addition, the American Library Association has adopted the following Library Bill of
Rights:
The American Library Association affirms that all libraries are forums for information and ideas, and that the following basic policies should guide their
services.
1. Books and other library resources should bc provided for the interest,
information, and enlightenment of all people of the community the li-
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librarians adequately to serve their patrons within these ethical principles, they must be sufficiently independent of the institution so that
they can observe their professional precepts. Just as a doctor needs a
measure of independence to serve a patient, or a lawyer needs independence to serve a client, a librarian needs independence to serve
the interests of the library patron. This need is particularly acute in
the areas of book selection and removal. 4
Finally, there may be a sort of countervailing claim of the books
themselves. Libraries can flourish and function only in an atmosphere of respect for the role in civilized society of the written word.
That atmosphere of respect, along with an attendant respect for
others who are using the library, is why we customarily speak in
libraries with hushed voices. It may be why some libraries have
stained glass windows, marble stairs and columns, indirect lighting,
plush draperies, and other accoutrements that we customarily associate with such other places of reverence and respect as churches and
courthouses. Part of the role that the library performs in a school is
to inculcate that sense of respect in the students. Book removal policies which violate that atmosphere of respect interfere with the library's ability to perform its essential function. For example, it
would be ruinous to the library environment if school policies directed that disfavored books be not only removed but also mutilated
and publicly burned.
What stands out from this context of complex interrelationships
and countervailing institutional constraints is the principle that Justice Blackmun ultimately found at the heart of the Pico case: the
idea that the removal of books for the purpose of suppressing an
brary serves. Materials should not be excluded because of the origin,
background, or views of those contributing to their creation.
2. Libraries should provide materials and information presenting all
points of view on current and historical issues. Materials should not be
proscribed or removed because of partisan or doctrinal disapproval.
3. Libraries should challenge censorship in the fulfillment of their responsibility to provide information and enlightenment.
4. Libraries should cooperate with all persons and groups concerned with
resisting abridgement of free expression and free access to ideas.
5. A person's right to use a library should not be denied or abridged
because of origin, age, background, or views.
6. Libraries which make exhibit spaces and meeting rooms available to
the public they serve should make such facilities available on an equitable
basis, regardless of the beliefs or affiliations of individuals or groups requesting their use.
AMERICAN AsSOCIATION OF LAW LIBRARIES, DIRECTORY AND HANDBOOK 682 (32d ed. 1992)
(reprinting AALL Library Bill of Rights and incorporating them into AALL Code of Ethics).
74. See Yudof, supra note 4, at 553 ("What is to be feared are hyperkinetic politicians
who seek to intervene in day-to-day book selection and curricular decisions.").
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idea is an impermissible infringement of First Amendment freedoms.
Suppressing ideas is antithetical to the educational enterprise of the
school. It prevents the testing and challenge necessary if students are
to appreciate the merits of civic virtue, and the worth and power of
important ideas. Suppressing ideas through book removal is equally,
if not more, antithetical to the function of a library because it tramples on the value of intellectual diversity, betrays disrespect for the
written word, and threatens the professional independence of the
librarian.
Moreover, book removal for the purpose of suppressing ideas is
completely distinct from the permissible forms of book removal in
which librarians routinely engage. When a librarian removes a book
from the shelf because it is outdated, because it is less useful to
readers than an alternative, or even because it is not as good as an
alternative, her judgment is comparative. It does not deny the value
of the book removed; 75 rather, it merely asserts the superior value,
within the context of the particular library's institutional framework,
of a preferred alternative.7 6 This sort of comparative, relative judgment is wholly different from the intellectual and moral absolutism
that was apparent on the record in Pico.
Thus, Justice Brennan's emphasis on the individual and Justice
Blackmun's emphasis on the library relationship ultimately led them
to a point of common ground. From either perspective, imposed orthodoxy is impermissible. And from both perspectives (especially, I
would argue, from the relational perspective) the controlling motivation for book removal becomes critical. Tests of motivation in constitutional law have often been criticized as unworkable,7 but here
such a test is simply unavoidable. It is not the act of removal itself,
but the reason for the act, which potentially threatens the library's
constitutionally safeguarded function.
75. After all, either that librarian or one of her predecessors had deemed the book of
sufficient value to purchase it in the first place.
76. Justice Blackmun exhibited sensitivity to the difference between comparative and
absolute judgments regarding book removal when he characterized his list of permissible judgments in terms of "choos[ing] one book over another." 457 U.S. at 880.
77. See Gamsky, supra note 4, at 732-45 (discussing problems with motive inquiry in
first amendment cases generally, and in Pico in particular); Ingber, supra note 4, at 62-66
(critizing Pico motivation test). For discussion of motivation tests in constitutional law, see
generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUiS BRANCH 208-221 (1962); Paul
Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. REV. 95; Theodore Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive:
Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 39 (1977); John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970); LAURENCE M. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-5, b (2d ed. 1988).
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III.

Implications for the Future

If I am right that Justice Blackmun's jurisprudence in this instance (and perhaps in others) carries with it an emphasis on designing constitutional protections for relationships, his approach may
have profound implications for the development of constitutional law
in the next century. It is irresistable, poised as we are at the close of
both a century and a millennium, to lengthen one's perspective, both
forward and backward, and to try to predict in what fundamental
ways the future will be different from the past. In constitutional law,
I think it is fair to say that the past century has witnessed the discovery of individual rights. Most of the provisions of the Bill of
Rights and the Civil War Amendments received relatively scant
treatment during the nineteenth century. But in the twentieth century these provisions of the Constitution budded and blossomed into
an elaborate rights jurisprudence.
The rights jurisprudence of the twentieth century has been preoccupied with the protection of the individual. In many ways, of
course, this is hardly surprising. The language of the Bill of Rights
has a decidedly individual cast. It was drafted by Framers whose
political philosophy and social experience led them to view liberty in
starkly individualistic terms. Well into the twentieth century, the image of the rugged individualist held a dominant position in American
democratic mythology. That image still influences American attitudes on a wide range of political, social, and legal issues. And in
contrast to many other postindustrial societies, we remain a remarkably individualistic nation. For at least these reasons, it has seemed
natural to view the subject of civil liberties in a bipolar fashion, as a
conflict between the interests of the individual and the commands of
the state, with liberty as the prize for the individual to win in this
conflict.
I doubt that many of us would be willing entirely to surrender
this imagery of our rights. We jealously value our autonomy, our
independence from the dictates of the madding crowd. Even where
our autonomy has been sacrificed to the collective good, we cling to
the perception that our individualism somehow remains intact. Our
schools, and other inculcative institutions in American society including the courts, have done their jobs well. We are steeped in philosophical, political, and cultural adherence to a doctrine of individualism that, perhaps as much as any other cultural bond, marks us as
quintessentially American. Moreover, our collective love affair with
individual liberty has been surprisingly successful. We have been
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able to build a vast, complex, and (by much of the rest of the world's
standards) fabulously wealthy society without having to sacrifice
many important components of our individual freedom.
Yet there are strong reasons to believe that, unless it undergoes
some fairly fundamental changes, the individualism of the past may
not survive long into the future. We live in an increasingly interdependent society, one in which there are progressively fewer opportunities for thoroughgoing individualism to flourish. This interdependent world places demands upon us that are increasingly inconsistent
with the isolation and self-sufficiency that ultimate individualism requires. We have less and less true privacy. We are under ever
greater pressure to subordinate personal idiosyncrasies to the demands of a collective order. We are subject to a host of homogenizing influences that qualify, counter, and sometimes even prevent the
development of personal independence. With respect to personal autonomy, we are a society in conflict with itself. We may also be a
society that is in the throes of transition from one conception of liberty to another.
One response to this set of developments is to insist on retaining,
to the extent we can, those pockets of individualism that can be
made to coexist with the new order. In my view this is what much of
modern constitutional law under the Bill of Rights - quite properly
is all about. But that may not be the only response, and it may
not even be the most effective one if our goal is to maximize the
blessings of liberty. Another approach is to redefine what we mean
by liberty in ways that take into account the inevitability of interdependence and the demands it places upon us. Constructing a jurisprudence of constitutionally protected relationships strikes me as an
important step toward this latter approach. 8
There are, of course, some protections for relationships already
present in constitutional law. The fourth amendment, for example,
specifies protection for the home, an important locus of relational
78. There has been some interest among scholars in the idea of a jurisprudence of relationships, perhaps most notably (though not exclusively) among scholars taking a feminist perspective. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1989); Gidon
Gottlieb, Relationism: Legal Theory for a Relational Society, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 567 (1983);
Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860 (1987);
Suzanna Sherry, The Gender of Judges, 4 LAW & INEQUALITY 159 (1986); Suzanna Sherry,
Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543
(1986); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-20 (2d ed. 1988); Robin
West, Foreword: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REv. 43 (1990); Robin L. West,
Liberalism Rediscovered: A Pragmatic Definition of the Liberal Vision, 46 U. PITT. L. REV.
673 (1985).
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interests."9 The Court has interpreted the due process right of privacy to protect intimate relations, marriage, and family interests.8 0
The first amendment protects freedom of political and intimate association,8" as well as religious association.' Even the right of access
that Justice Brennan pressed in Pico can have a significant relational
component. 83 But in the society of the future, these traces of consti-

tutional protection for relational interests may not be sufficient to
guarantee liberty. The Court may be
draw from the generalities of the Bill
ninth amendment, 4 perhaps even from
or immunities clause of the fourteenth

challenged to go further, to
of Rights, perhaps from the
the long-neglected privileges
amendment,8 5 a wider set of

79. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980) (prohibiting warrantless
entry into home for purposes of making an arrest; noting that "the sanctity of the home...
has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic").
80. E.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (marriage); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (marriage); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)(marriage; intimate relations); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972) (intimate relations); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (family
relationships).
81. E.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (recognizing first
amendment right of association); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980) (political association);
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (same); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609
(1984) (extending first amendment right to include intimate association); cf Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1 (1964); Kenneth L.
Karst, Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980).
82. E.g., Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976) (religious organizations); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (personal religious association).
83. Indeed, Justice Blackmun himself recognized this relational aspect of a right of access in one of his early opinions for the Court, Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
The case involved a challenge to the government's denial of a visa to an individual who had
been invited to speak at various scholarly seminars in the United States. The Immigration and
Nationality Act barred from entry persons who publish or advocate "the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of world communism," and Mandel's application for a visa
had been denied on the strength of this provision. The Supreme Court upheld denial of the
visa, but in doing so it rejected the government's assertion that no first amendment interests
were present because persons wishing to discover Mr. Mandel's opinions could read his publications. Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun acknowledged a first amendment "right to
'receive information and ideas,'" and he recognized the importance within that right of "sustained face-to-face debate, discussion and questioning." 408 U.S. at 765.
84. There has been renewed interest in the Ninth Amendment among legal scholars.
See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1
(1985); Russell L. Caplan, The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 69 VA. L.
REV. 223 (1983); Phoebe A. Haddon, An Essay on the Ninth Amendment: Interpretationfor
the New World Order, 2 TEMPLE POL. & Civ. RIGHTS L. REV.
(1993); Thomas B.
McAffee, The Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1215 (1990);
Calvin R. Massey, Federalism and Fundamental Rights: The Ninth Amendment, 38 HASTINGs L.J. 305 (1987); Suzanna Sherry, The Ninth Amendment: Righting an Unwritten Constitution, 64 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1001 (1988).
85. For discussion pro and con, see, e.g., Timothy S. Bishop, Comment, The Privileges
or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Intent, 79 Nw. U. L. REV.
142 (1984); John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE
L.J. 1385 (1992); Philip B. Kurland, The Privileges or Immunities Clause: "'Its Hour Come
Round at Last?", 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 405; Lino A. Graglia, Do We Have an Unwritten
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relationships that are guaranteed at least some measure of independence from government.
Justice Blackmun's Pico concurrence offers us some guidance
for the task of identifying these constitutionally protected relational
interests. In Pico, Justice Blackmun focused on the link between the
essential functions of libraries and the process of self-government.
The library is entitled to constitutional protection, in his view, because it serves an important role in developing the kind of independent, thoughtful, informed citizenry a government needs to survive.
In other words, the library fosters both individual development and
the integration of the individual into the community. Orthodoxy enforced through book removal violates the first amendment because it
directly interferes with the library's capacity to assist the processes
of self-government." The school board cannot interfere with the library's capacity to do so, because any such interference would also
violate the school's own constitutional role of preparing students for
87
their future civic responsibility.
This is a methodology that we can generalize. With respect to
other relational interests that are candidates for constitutional protection, we may also ask: Does this relationship perform an important function in fostering individual development? Does it contribute
to the integration of the individual into a wider community? Does it
assist self-government? If so, which features of the relationship are
essential to preserving these functions? These may not be the only
questions we need to ask in order to define constitutionally protected
relationships, but they form a useful starting place for inquiry.
Justice Blackmun's Pico opinion also reminds us that even
where we find such relationships, the protection the Constitution affords them cannot be absolute. Indeed, it may not even be as generous as the protections the Constitution affords to individuals. The
reason is that relationships entail both rights and responsibilities,
and they involve an interplay of potentially conflicting individual and
Constitution? - The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 12
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL. 83 (1989).
86. For a thoughtful discussion of this aspect of the Pico case, and an endorsement of
Justice Blackmun's concurrence as a workable rationale for the decision, see Kamiat, supra
note 4 at 533-35. See also Lee, supra 4, at 326-27 (concluding that Justice Blackmun's approach offers "better guidance" than "the plurality's ill-conceived notion of a right to receive"
information).
87. On this aspect of the case, Justices Brennan and Blackmun fully agreed. Compare
Pico, 457 U.S. at 869 (opinion of Brennan, J.) with 457 U.S. at 881 (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
For a discussion of Pico's emphasis on self-government, linking it to broader themes in
first amendment jurisprudence, see Kamiat, supra note 4, at 512-17. The author ends up
favoring Justice Blackmun's approach as the sounder resolution of the case. Id. at 533-35.
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institutional interests (including the government's own) that must be
mutually accommodated. 8 8 Thus, to the litany of questions identified
above we must add another: What countervailing interests - either
of institutions or of other participants in the relationship - necessitate accommodation?
This last inquiry suggests that the exacting strict scrutiny standard that the Court has developed for protection of purely individual
rights may not be the appropriate medium for judicial review in a
relational setting. Although Justice Blackmun's Pico opinion did not
say so specifically, one could well infer from his extensive list of permissible reasons for book removal that Justice Blackmun was not
applying true strict scrutiny. Indeed, in function if not in phrasing,
his approach seems to lie closer to intermediate scrutiny - a recognition that even content-specific book removal must be allowed if it
substantially advances important governmental interests. This is
fully consistent with the observation, noted at the outset of this article, that relationships by their very nature invite a higher level of
appropriate government regulation than do purely individual

concerns.
The problem that the Court faced in Pico has by no means vanished from the scene, nor is it likely ever to do so. The "solution" to
that problem worked out by the Pico plurality may not be so durable. The plurality rationale for the decision in Pico lacks the force of
precedent, and changes in Court personnel since Pico have moved
the Court's center of gravity several steps to the right. If the issue
were to arise again before the current Court, one might well anticipate a majority coalescing around the position Justice Rehnquist
staked out in his Pico dissent. 89 But it is just barely possible that in a
88. Indeed, it would be dangerous to indulge too romantic a view of relationships, even
those that are entitled to constitutional protection. For example, Justice Blackmun has been a
leader on the Court in extending constitutional protection to the preservation of family bonds.
See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (extending procedural due process rights
to proceedings for termination of parent-child relationships) (per Blackmun, J.). But he has
remained keenly aware of the potential for such family relationships to fail, and of the responsibility of the state to intervene when they do. E.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Dep't of Social
Service, 489 U.S. 189, 212-13 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (castigating court for dismissing civil rights claim against the government for knowingly failing to protect a child from
an abusive parent: "It is a sad commentary upon American life, and constitutional principles
- so full of late of patriotic fervor and proud proclamations about 'liberty and justice for all,'
that this child, Joshua DeShaney, now is assigned to live out the remainder of his life profoundly retarded. Joshua and his mother. . . deserve . . . the constitutional protection that 42
U.S.C. § 1983 is meant to provide.") In other words, protection under the Constitution for
such a relationship at times prohibits state intervention, but at other times it affirmatively
requires such intervention.
89. Indeed, the Court has adopted strongly deferential positions in subsequent cases involving first amendment challenges to public school policies. See, e.g., Hazlewood School Dist.
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more distant future, perhaps sometime in the next century, the
Court will look back to Pico for inspiration on the issues of library
book selection and removal. If so, the Court may well find in Justice
Blackmun's opinion the seeds of an idea whose time may have finally
come - the idea of constitutionally protected relationships.

v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675
.(1986). For an argument that Kuhimeier indirectly undercuts the decision in Pico, see
O'Brien, supra note 4, at 1817-18.

